New Space
Space is no longer an abstract notion. Heavy, reusable rocket technology has brought it to our front door.
Conceptually, we have entered a new territory, where the EU feels rather uneasy. Space used to be populated exclusively by governments, quite well-regulated and relatively peaceful, and both technology and norms were moving at the speed of bureaucracy.
In the last decade, lower entry barriers and expanding expertise have vastly increased the number of participants in space-related activities, resulting in an alleged democratization of space access and use. There are not only NASA, ESA, Roscosmos, and JAXA, together with the headline-grabbing SpaceX, Amazon, or Virgin Galactic; their ranks have been swollen by "developing states, small companies and even high schools".
It is now a contested domain, as outer space is increasingly weaponized and treated as a legitimate warfighting zone (in November 2019, NATO declared space as an operational domain).
The stakes in space have been raised, and thus have altered the nature of the competition - it is no longer just in space, but increasingly for space. In the words of the author of Scramble for the Skies,
There is a new space race just beginning—though one of a vastly different character. It is not, as before, a race for prestige and honor among nations, or a contest between ideologies. It is rather a race to secure the determinants of economic and military power between states. [...] It is a race to industrialize the inner solar system through access to its billion-fold greater resources. It is a race to write the rules of a new global order. The absolute gains of such a venture could uplift humanity and secure the future of our planet and our species for centuries to come. It could provide a level of riches to Earth that parallel the economic development of the first industrial revolution. (p. 1-2)
Others speak of "an off-world economy capable of supporting growing wealth and prosperity on Earth", one that could no less than "disrupt scarcity-based geopolitical competition on Earth [...] by adding massive new, untapped, and environmentally friendly resources into the global economy" (space-for-Earth); additionally, there is the budding space-for-space economy. Once deep-space exploration and human space settlement will gain momentum, we will witness the emergence of a cosmic system, compared to which "terrestrial spheres of influence seem small, if not entirely obsolete".
China
China has as sizeable and growing presence in space. It is already a "complete space power with autonomous access to outer space and to deep-space exploration". As per the satellite database maintained by the Union of Concerned Scientists, US has 2800 operating satellites, followed by China with 430, and Russia with 170. China has put up its own space station in order to establish a permanent presence in LEO and above, and is aiming to develop capacity for cislunar supremacy and deep-space exploration within the next thirty years.
China openly competes with the US, in relation to which it strives to achieve technological parity, and eventually technological dominance. It has been labeled by the European Commission "an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance". By drawing Russia closer, China has set the stage for the formation of two "space blocs" around the two protagonists.
China frames its space ventures as the "space dream", part of "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" and of "the dream to make China stronger"; its ambitions are centered on long-term wealth creation through a space-based economy.
Private sector
Similar to US - but unlike EU - the private sector is a significant participant in Chinese space ventures : in 2018 there were close to 150 autochthonous aerospace enterprises. Currently, some speak of "an explosion of space startups" that "is supercharging tech innovation, opening new markets around the world, and expanding the country's influence".
The spark was a 2014 policy directive which reflected the government's decision to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, and was aimed at (hidden among a flurry of other targets), "encouragement of private capital's participation in China's construction of civilian space infrastructure". Until Spring 2021, commercial space companies have raised around 5 bn EUR.
In contrast, in Europe, space was considered until recently as the exclusive playground of governments and large companies. Access to funding for European startups is limited, and as a result many (if not most of them) relocate to greener pastures; nevertheless, things appear to be slowly improving.
Disruptive tendencies
As remarked in the 2020 US Defense Space Strategy, “China and Russia each have weaponized space as a means to reduce US and allied military effectiveness and challenge our freedom of operation in space.”
Although the Outer Space Treaty (OST), the primary international legal instrument, forbids “national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means”, I wouldn't be surprised if China declares sovereignty over the area where its future lunar base is located - and who is going to successfully contest this claim? China has gained extensive experience in successfully defending contested territory (in the South China Sea) by building military installations virtually out of the sea, and through aggressive actions and means below the threshold of war. In space, or on the celestial bodies, what would be the equivalent of Freedom-of-Navigation Operations ran by the US Navy through what China claims as territorial waters, in order to express and defend international rejection of this claim?
On the other hand, China aims to have a prominent role in instituting global norms on space behavior. My interpretation of its actions is that it signals that its interests and values have to be taken into account, otherwise any security and normative order is not viable (we have to be part of the solution, otherwise we will be a huge problem).
Challenges for Europe
Space governance
EU is aware that it "should pay special attention to the evolution of the legal and normative environment; a situation where the first innovator is able to unilaterally define the rules should be avoided".
The current security structures are unstable, and the existing normative arrangements are widely acknowledged as inadequate; attempts to design new ones through multilateral negotiations in the framework of established institutions are not keeping pace with the unfolding events and technological developments. National space policies are developed mostly unilaterally, with little concern for international cooperation and commitments in mind. There is some justified anxiety on both sides of the Atlantic that Russia and China might impose "an alternative vision that does not comport with US and allied values and norms" unless "US and like-minded nations extend the rules-based order to outer space".
If the EU aspires to be a major normative space power (or at least a a convincing agenda-setter), it has to be prepared and to prove it is ready, willing, and able to defend (including militarily) the kind of order it favors. Also, the European defensive posture and actions should have a global cover, as opposed to a narrow European focus.
Unfortunately, the EU falls short on all accounts.
First of all, the EU does not currently consider even an active defense of its space assets, opting instead for risk avoidance through stealth; obviously, punitive action against norm-violating behaviors and actors is out of question.
I have also never encountered the idea of protecting non-European space assets, not even allied ones. Contrast this with the US self-assigned role of "providing the public good of security in Earth orbit, just as the US Navy instills confidence in maritime commerce on the high seas".
Moreover, military activities in space are outside the remit of European Space Agency (ESA), being conducted at national level (more below about this intergovernmental organization). This means that European countries have neither the experience of - nor the institutional framework for - a joint, concerted military effort in space, so - much to the frustration of its allies - the EU seems doomed to perpetually punch below its weight (with the potential unfortunate consequence that the weight is reduced to a level proportional to the punch).
Fragmentation
As already acknowledged by the European Parliament, "there are notable divisions between member states on how to utilize and view space". Many others have also noted a "lack of convergence in the definition of a shared long-term vision, aligning all relevant actors in terms of ambition, technological priorities, industrial policy, procurement models, roles and responsibilities". It was expressed quite forcefully by EU Commissioner Thierry Breton : "We do not have a coherent approach, rather a scattered and inefficient one. We are duplicating efforts by not being coordinated and wasting resources by not being organized. We are missing disruptive technologies by not working together."
Lower costs of entry in the space sector have encouraged European countries to imagine that each of them can strike out on their own. Currently, the European approach seems to be shared between national or intergovernmental programs, and the EU Space Programme. This is in stark contrast with the European Space Agency (ESA) Convention, which emphasized in the preamble the need to pool resources for space endeavors, "considering that the magnitude of human, technical and financial resources required for activities in the space field is such that these resources lie beyond the means of any single European country".
ESA is not, despite its name, a European Union agency (it was planned to become one, but this never materialized); in its own words, it is "an entirely independent organization although it maintains close ties with the EU through an ESA/EC Framework Agreement". The current Financial Framework Partnership Agreement (FFPA) between EU (represented by the European Commission) and ESA was officially signed on 22 June 2021, marking the end of an intense negotiation period, at the end of which ESA retained its autonomy, despite the fact that the European Commission is the most important financial contributor. It has been remarked "a lack of political will, mostly by the ESA's Member States and the ESA itself, to move towards the creation of a single European entity responsible for space policy in the continent, under the umbrella of EU".
ESA has been founded as a facilitator and integrator of national programs and the creator, coordinator, and manager of European-wide space programs; it did not supersede national space programs and agencies, nor did it render these obsolete - quite the opposite, the latter were a prerequisite for the former. States join ESA and participate in the optional programs on a voluntary basis, according to national strategies, interests, and priorities. I would expect the Member States to manifest the same kind of attitude towards EU-run space programs and corresponding institutions.
To further muddy the waters, ESA is not the only key institutional actor in the EU space program; another one, besides the European Commission, is the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA). Here is a succinct description of the relationship between them :
The European Commission, as project manager, steers the wheel towards pressing societal, economic or environmental challenges where #EUSpace makes a difference. EUSPA, as the EU market-oriented agency, makes sure that these challenges are addressed through the design and development of new space-based services which meet the needs of the users, while ensuring its market uptake. ESA ensures the roll-out of new satellite technology and architecture of the systems that provide the services.
Lack of a common European position is visible also when it comes to the new rules of the game; case in point, the US initiative dubbed the Artemis Accord, which sets out preferred principles for a new era of space exploration, and has already been joined by Italy, Poland and Luxembourg, but continue to be opposed by Germany and France.
Dependence
The most striking aspect - and the most damaging to European ambitions - is the lack of autonomy in the conduct of its space activities.
The problem is much deeper than the absence of a European Union space agency (as mentioned above). As discussed in a report that places European Space Strategy in a Global Context, and reflected into one of ESA's functions focused on External Coordination for Technology Non dependence,
While Europe possesses the broad majority of the technologies, processes and industrial capabilities needed to develop space programmes, European stakeholders still need to externally source certain components, and raw and advanced materials as well as some basic technologies and building blocks that are not available within European boundaries. The most glaring example of European technological dependence is the number of foreign EEE components utilized in European satellites: the European Space Technology Master Plan (ESTMP) reports that "on a typical ESA satellite programme more than half of the EEE component procurement costs are still associated to components procured from outside Europe". (p. 64)
Possessing (all or most) pieces of the techno-industrial puzzle is certainly not enough; according to some space policy experts, the EU "does not have the technical expertise to pursue a space program without ESA".
In addition to autonomous access to space, the EU lacks the independent capabilities to achieve space security objectives, or even - more generally - to safeguard its interests in space.
By comparison, the fact that - in contrast with all the other major space powers - EU lacks the capability for human spaceflight is utterly unimpressive.
Why bother?
Is Europe's expansion into space really important? My concise answer is that this is not just a nice-to-have, but a must-have.
The argument I have encountered most often is that the space sector is a prerequisite and enabler of European strategic autonomy, i.e., the ability to act autonomously to promote its interests and defend its values. It has been noted that lack of autonomous access to space "harms Europe’s prestige and bargaining power on the international stage, making European diplomatic efforts, its potential to influence others, and the exercise of soft power, less effective".
I am nevertheless afraid that at stake is much more than that.
The existential imperative : A wealthy EU is the only EU
As mentioned at the outset, the wealth generated by space commercialization and settlement is expected to dwarf even the largest national economies of today.
And wealth is a key ingredient on which hinges the attractiveness and success of the European project. This was illustrated first by the motivation of former Communist countries in joining the Union. The recent economic crises have also shown that hard times make the intra-European rifts surface and deepen, and the centrifugal and fragmenting forces intensify, as it appears to be little economic solidarity between the Member States. Most recently, conflicts between the European Commission and Member States like Hungary and Poland around fundamental European values like the rule of law, have shown that the available instruments for disciplining straying and unruly countries are primarily financial.
Without direct access to a substantial share of the wealth generated from space, EU will cease to be either prosperous or independent, and will most likely disintegrate as a result of internal divisions, respectively external pressure. Unlike a nation-state, EU lacks intrinsic legitimacy due to the absence of a shared identity, which would allow it to weather hard times and reconstitute itself once the storm has passed (like Poland, or China so many times). An additional related benefit of a common, coherent, and ambitious European space program would be the development and reinforcement of a specific European identity.
Secondly, but perhaps no less important, the European way of life - bolstered by an extensive social security and protection system - might not be preserved in medium and long term, unless a massive influx of wealth is secured. The main reason is that the European Pillar of Social Rights might buckle under the financial pressure coming from, among other things, an ageing population and shrinking workforce.